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Why a Fair Compromise Requires Deliberation
Friderike Spang
I argue in this paper that the process of compromising needs to be deliberative if a fair compromise is 
the goal. More specifically, I argue that deliberation is structurally necessary in order to achieve a fair 
compromise. In developing this argument, this paper seeks to overcome a problematic dichotomy that 
is prevalent in the literature on deliberative democracy, which is the dichotomy between compromise 
and deliberation. This dichotomy entails the view that the process preceding the achievement of a 
compromise is essentially a process of negotiating or bargaining, which, I claim, should not be the case if 
a fair compromise is the goal. The reason for this claim is, in a nutshell, that negotiation or bargaining 
processes do not provide for an in-depth understanding of the reasons that each party has for holding 
their respective position. However, an in-depth understanding of each other’s reasons, is, as I will show, 
a necessary condition for achieving a fair compromise. In contrast to negotiation or bargaining, the 
deliberative process, by its very structure, provides for mutual understanding and is therefore a necessary 
condition for achieving a fair compromise.
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Introduction
This paper argues that the process of compromising needs 
to be deliberative if a fair compromise is the goal.1 More 
precisely, I argue that deliberation and compromise are 
inextricably connected in that deliberation is a structural 
necessity for achieving a fair compromise. This is not to 
say that the importance of deliberation for compromise, 
generally speaking, has not been recognized before. The 
idea that compromise is connected to deliberation has 
been pointed out by several deliberative democrats. Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, for example, suggest that 
without deliberation, ‘we forsake the possibility of arriving 
at a genuine moral compromise’ (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004: 12). Similarly, Daniel Weinstock points out that 
‘the attempt to arrive at a compromise is an exercise in 
moral deliberation rather than a simple exercise of “horse 
trading”’ (Weinstock, 2013: 540). More recently, Weinstock 
emphasizes that in the context of pluralist societies, 
‘compromise should be the goal that political deliberation 
sets for itself’ (Weinstock, 2017: 636). And Peter Jones and 
Ian O’Flynn state that ‘a substantively fair compromise 
is more likely to arise if the compromising process takes 
the form of deliberation rather than bargaining’ (Jones & 
O’Flynn, 2013: 127).
However, while these authors acknowledge the 
necessity of deliberation for compromise in general, their 
accounts do not demonstrate why exactly deliberation is 
required for achieving a fair compromise. In clarifying the 
procedural nature of compromising, this paper aims to fill 
this gap. More precisely, this paper contributes to ongoing 
debates about the relationship between compromise 
and deliberation in the following way: I argue that a fair 
compromise needs to be based on a process that is purely 
deliberative, from the beginning to the end. None of the 
existing discussions regarding the connection between 
deliberation and compromise have yet made this specific 
claim, which is, however, crucial to our understanding of 
achieving a fair compromise in practice. If my argument 
is correct and we can indeed achieve a fair compromise 
only through a process of proper deliberation, it would 
be detrimental to seek a fair compromise through 
(deliberative) negotiation, as existing accounts tend to 
suggest.
My argument is structured in the following way. In 
section I, I explain why it is necessary to clarify the 
procedural nature of compromising. For this purpose, 
I illustrate a problematic dichotomy that is prevalent in 
the literature on deliberative democracy, which is the 
dichotomy between compromise and deliberation. This 
dichotomy entails the view that the process preceding the 
achievement of a compromise is essentially a process of 
negotiating or bargaining, which I claim should not be 
the case if a fair compromise is the goal. The reason for 
this claim is, in a nutshell, that negotiation or bargaining 
processes do not provide for an in-depth understanding 
of the reasons that each party has for holding their 
respective position. However, an in-depth understanding 
of each other’s reasons, is, as I will show, a necessary 
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condition for achieving a fair compromise. In section 
II, I propose a conception of fair compromise according 
to which a fair compromise requires that each party’s 
concessions are proportional to what is at stake for the 
parties respectively. In section III, I use this conception 
of a fair compromise to develop the argument that 
deliberation is structurally necessary for achieving a fair 
compromise. From this argument follows the claim that 
the process of compromising needs to be deliberative if 
a fair compromise is the goal. Section IV concludes the 
paper with a reflection on the question how important it 
is that a compromise is fair.
I. Compromise vs. Deliberation: A Problematic 
Dichotomy
One of the primary concerns for deliberative democrats 
is the question of how we can legitimately accommodate 
moral disagreement in society and politics. As Gutmann 
and Thompson state, ‘[t]he general aim of deliberative 
democracy is to provide the most justifiable conception 
for dealing with moral disagreement in politics’ (Gutmann 
& Thompson, 2004: 10). Traditionally, it has been 
assumed that disagreement is best addressed through a 
deliberative process that focuses on the common good 
and that eventually leads to consensus. According to Jane 
Mansbridge et al. 2010:
[i]n the classic ideal [of deliberation], individu-
als enter a deliberation with conflicting opinions 
about what is good for the polity, but after voicing 
and hearing the reasons for different options, con-
verge on one option as the best, for the same rea-
sons. Ideally, the deliberation is based on reason. It 
aims at consensus and the common good (66).
This classic ideal is represented in the works of ‘first-
generation’ deliberative democrats, such as Jürgen 
Habermas and John Rawls (Elstub, 2010: 291). According 
to these early deliberative democrats, public deliberation 
should aim at consensus, because consensus is the 
ideal outcome of a rational exchange of reasons. That 
is, ideally, the participants to a deliberative process will 
find a consensus in light of new arguments and evidence. 
Consensus therefore reflects the reasoned points of view 
of the (previously) disagreeing parties. Thus understood, 
achieving a consensus meant that the deliberation 
process was successful (Elstub, 2010). In contrast, the 
classic ideal of deliberation excludes compromise as an 
acceptable outcome of a deliberative process.2 As Jon 
Elster puts this point, ‘[n]ot optimal compromise, but 
unanimous agreement is the goal of politics on this view’ 
(Elster, 1997: 12).
However, deliberative democrats increasingly 
acknowledge compromise as a legitimate solution to 
disagreement. Indeed, as Gutmann and Thompson point 
out, ‘many deliberative theorists now not only recognize 
but also insist on the need for, and value of, political 
compromise’ (Gutmann & Thompson, 2012: 84). For 
Gutmann and Thompson, compromise is a particularly 
desirable way to respond to fundamental disagreement 
that would otherwise persist at the expense of political 
progress and peace.
Other deliberative democratic theorists argue that the 
deliberative process can and should aim at compromise as 
a proper goal rather than merely as an alternative in case a 
consensus turns out to be unrealistic. For example, Richard 
Bellamy states that ‘differences have to be continually 
and democratically negotiated with compromise not 
consensus as the goal’ (Bellamy, 2000: 216). Similarly, 
Weinstock argues that ‘compromise rather than consensus 
is the goal toward which political debates aim’ (Weinstock, 
2006: 244). Here, the idea is that compromise can be a 
more adequate solution to disagreement than consensus, 
especially in cases of reasonable disagreement where 
all parties to the disagreement have valid claims. More 
specifically, compromise is endorsed as an adequate 
response to what John Rawls has called ‘the fact of 
reasonable pluralism’ (Rawls, 2001: 4).3 The argument here 
is that compromise, but not consensus, can accommodate 
the reasonable disagreements that are part of pluralistic 
societies. That is, in the case of reasonable disagreement, 
compromise, but not consensus, allows for equal concern 
and respect for all the reasonable views that are in conflict 
(Bellamy, Kornprobst & Reh, 2012).4
More recently, Federico Zuolo and Giulia Bistagnino 
(2018) address the desirability of compromise from an 
epistemic perspective. Seeking an answer to the question 
of how we should deal with deep, normative disagreements 
in pluralist, democratic societies, the authors argue that 
the recognition of epistemic parity may provide principled 
reasons for seeking a compromise. Christian Rostbøll 
sheds light on the desirability of compromise from yet 
another angle. Questioning the pervasive conception 
of compromise as ‘a regrettable necessity’ (Rostbøll, 
2017: 620), he proposes that compromise has a proper 
democratic significance that reveals itself if we adopt a 
conception of respect according to which we conceive of 
fellow citizens as co-rulers.
The increasing acknowledgement of the importance of 
compromise for deliberative democracy involves, however, 
a problematic dichotomy. A default assumption in the 
literature on deliberative democracy is that deliberation 
is required only if we aim for consensus. If, on the other 
hand, we aim for compromise, non-deliberative processes 
such as negotiation or bargaining are considered to be 
more appropriate.5 This view is represented, for example, 
in Philippe Van Parijs’s statement that ‘negotiation can 
lead to a compromise that avoids the costs and risks of 
conflict, exit or arbitration, whereas deliberation can lead 
to a consensus about what is required for a fair solution’ 
(Van Parijs, 2012: 469; emphasis in original). Or, as Simon 
May puts it, ‘compromise is the paradigmatic feature of 
negotiation’ (May, 2018: 150). In brief, the idea is that we 
achieve consensus through deliberation and compromise 
through negotiation.
This view is problematic because it indicates that 
deliberation and compromise are mutually exclusive 
phenomena, which, as I argue in this paper, is not the 
case. In this context, one might ask whether the idea 
of a ‘deliberative negotiation’, which has recently been 
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introduced by Mark Warren and Jane Mansbridge (2016), 
does not already constitute the required alternative to the 
problematic dichotomous view. Deliberative negotiation 
denotes a negotiation process that entails deliberative 
features, such as mutual justification, respect and a 
concern with fairness (Warren & Mansbridge, 2016: 151). 
By introducing this concept, the authors intend to do 
justice to the fact that negotiation processes can entail 
deliberative elements, which, in their view, has been 
largely neglected not only in theory but also in practice.
However, deliberative negotiation constitutes a 
conceptual alternative to a different dichotomy than 
the one that I criticize in this paper. More precisely, 
deliberative negotiation addresses the dichotomy between 
deliberation and negotiation, not between deliberation 
and (fair) compromise. That is, Warren and Mansbridge 
problematize the distinction between deliberation and 
negotiation by pointing out that negotiation processes 
can be characterized by distinctively deliberative features. 
But they still conceive of compromise, including fair 
compromise, as a possible outcome of (deliberative) 
negotiation and not of deliberation proper (or, as they call 
it, pure deliberation). Put differently, even though Warren 
and Mansbridge’s conception of deliberative negotiation 
entails the possibility that a fair compromise is based on 
pure deliberation, it is not clear from their account that 
a fair compromise requires pure deliberation necessarily. 
According to Warren and Mansbridge, a fair compromise 
could also result from a negotiation process that merely 
entails deliberative moments. This paper, in contrast, 
argues that a fair compromise necessarily needs to be 
based on deliberation properly speaking.
To be clear, I do not claim that the assumptions inherent 
in the dichotomous view are mistaken as such. Of course, 
deliberation can and should lead to consensus; and 
clearly, negotiation and bargaining can and should lead 
to compromise. My point, rather, is that we are mistaken 
to assume that negotiation or bargaining can reliably 
lead to a fair compromise. By providing an in-depth 
understanding of the reasons why a fair compromise 
requires deliberation, the arguments put forward in this 
paper not merely question those accounts that perpetuate 
the dichotomous view, but also support existing accounts 
that generally acknowledge a connection between 
deliberation and fair compromise.
II. A Conception of Fair Compromise
Since the argument put forward in this paper concerns 
fair compromise specifically, it is crucial to consider the 
sense in which a compromise may be said to be fair. 
According to Jones and O’Flynn, a compromise can be fair 
with regard to its content or with regard to the procedure 
on which it is based. As a matter of procedural fairness, 
a compromise is fair if it is based on a fair process. As a 
matter of substantive (or end-state) fairness, a compromise 
is fair if it reflects a fair outcome (Jones & O’Flynn, 
2013). This paper is concerned with fair compromise in 
the substantive rather than the procedural sense. The 
question then is: What kind of outcome qualifies as a fair 
compromise?
Before addressing this question, a brief conceptual 
clarification is in order. Van Parijs argues that once the 
disagreeing parties consider an outcome to be fair, we 
no longer speak of a compromise, but of a consensus. He 
provides the following example: ‘Suppose a cake needs to 
be split between you and me in circumstances in which 
we would each like to eat the whole thing. There is no 
compromise, but rather a consensus if we both believe 
that cutting the cake in half is fair’ (Van Parijs, 2012: 470). 
I disagree. A fair compromise is still a compromise and not 
a consensus, because neither party gets what they initially 
wanted – which, in Van Parijs’s example, is the whole cake. 
Put otherwise, the parties have not changed their minds 
with regard to their initial desire to eat the whole cake. It 
is, however, precisely this change of mind that is required 
for speaking of a consensus. In Van Parijs’s example, 
even though the disagreeing parties might consider it 
to be a fair solution that each party gets half of the cake, 
they do not consider this agreement to be superior (or 
equally good) to getting the whole cake. Therefore, a fair 
compromise is still a compromise, not a consensus.6
To resume the characterization of a fair (substantive) 
compromise, it is useful to acknowledge that every 
compromise is characterized by mutual concessions 
(Bellamy, Kornprobst & Reh, 2012; Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2012; Jones & O’Flynn, 2013; Lepora, 2012; 
Margalit, 2010; Warren & Mansbridge, 2016). As Van Parijs 
points out, ‘[a] compromise is an agreement, but not just 
any agreement. Its distinctiveness resides in the mutual 
concessions involved’ (Van Parijs, 2012: 469). I therefore 
suggest that the fairness of a compromise is to be 
evaluated with regard to the concessions that each party 
makes. More precisely, I suggest that a fair compromise 
is characterized by a proportionality of concessions; and I 
further suggest that the proportionality of concessions is 
to be determined in relation to the stakes that are involved 
for each party to a disagreement.
This conception of a fair compromise is based on the 
‘proportionality principle’ that has been introduced by 
Harry Brighouse and Marc Fleurbaey. The proportionality 
principle holds that ‘[p]ower in any decision-making 
process should be proportional to individual stakes’ 
(Brighouse & Fleurbaey, 2010: 138; emphasis in original). 
To be sure, Brighouse and Fleurbaey’s primary concern is 
with the fair distribution of power in democratic decision-
making processes, not with determining the fairness 
of compromise. But I suggest that the proportionality 
principle is well suited to determine the fairness of 
compromise as well, for the following reason. Brighouse 
and Fleurbaey justify the proportionality principle by 
pointing out that a proportional distribution of power 
is better suited to implement equal respect than an 
egalitarian distribution of power.7 The reason for this 
claim is that in those cases where the stakes are not equal 
for all citizens and where those citizens with greater stakes 
are in the minority, an equal share of power often means 
that minority interests get buried under majority interests 
– even though it is the minority that has higher stakes 
in an issue. I suggest that the same reasoning applies to 
the context of compromise as well. We can hardly profess 
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to show equal respect for two disagreeing parties if we 
require that both parties split their concessions equally, 
even though one party has much higher stakes involved 
in a disagreement. Thus understood, only a distribution of 
concessions that is proportional to individual stakes can 
manifest equal respect.
A fair compromise, as it is understood in this paper, 
therefore requires that each party’s concessions are 
proportional to what is at stake for them in a specific 
disagreement. More concretely, this means that the 
concessions should be lower if the stakes are high and 
vice versa the concessions should be higher if the stakes 
are low. Stakes are here understood to pertain to a 
person’s interests and moral values that are affected by a 
disagreement. For example, a person can be said to have 
high stakes in a disagreement if the values in question 
pertain to her identity, her conception of justice, or to 
general moral principles that play an important role in 
leading her life. Conversely, a person can be said to have 
low stakes in a disagreement if, for instance, she is merely 
interested in the topic of disagreement without having 
a deeper connection to the issue, in the sense that the 
values in question do not affect her sense of self or do not 
significantly violate moral principles that are important to 
her. I discuss the difference between high and low stakes 
more concretely in the next section.
III. Why Deliberation is Structurally Necessary 
for Achieving a Fair Compromise
In this section, I explain why deliberation is structurally 
necessary for achieving a fair compromise.8 More 
specifically, I argue that the process towards achieving 
a fair compromise needs to be constituted by a 
deliberative structure from the beginning to the end.9 
As such, the process of compromising is characterized 
by a mutual exchange of reasons with the goal of mutual 
understanding and a fair accommodation of the claims in 
play – which means that the process of compromising is 
deliberative in nature. Or, to put this point differently, I 
claim that in the process of achieving a fair compromise, 
there is no room for bargaining or negotiation at all. 
This also means that the activity of compromising (with 
the goal of achieving a fair compromise) is not a process 
that comes after deliberating; rather, for the purpose of 
achieving a fair compromise, the activity of compromising 
is deliberating.10
The claim that deliberation is structurally necessary for 
achieving a fair compromise is based on the conception 
of a fair compromise that I have developed in the 
previous section (i.e. the idea that a fair compromise is 
characterized by concessions that are proportional to the 
stakes that are involved for each party). I argue that if we 
accept this conception of a fair compromise, we also have 
to accept the claim that the process of compromising 
needs to be deliberative, from the beginning to the point 
where a compromise is agreed upon.
To develop the argument that compromising needs 
to be deliberative if a fair compromise is the goal, it is 
helpful to break the process of compromising down into 
three successive stages. All three stages are interrelated 
in the sense that each stage requires the previous stage. 
The first stage is to understand each other’s reasons for 
holding a particular view. The second stage is to evaluate 
the stakes that are involved for each party. This second 
stage requires the previous reason exchange because what 
is at stake for each party is determined by the reasons that 
each party has for holding their view. The third stage is to 
determine the concessions that each party should make. 
This stage requires the previous evaluation of stakes 
because the concessions – if they are to be fair – need to 
be proportional to the stakes involved.
In what follows, I explain why deliberation is required 
for each of these three stages. I claim that for the purpose 
of achieving a fair compromise, all three stages need to 
be deliberative and only deliberative and that there is, 
therefore, no room for negotiation or bargaining in the 
process of compromising.11
Understanding reasons
One of the central characteristics – if not the most 
distinctive feature – of the deliberative process is the 
mutual exchange of reasons between the participants 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Mansbridge et al., 2010; 
Thompson, 2008; Weinstock, 2013). By exchanging 
the reasons for holding their respective positions, the 
disagreeing parties come to understand each other’s 
position (and possibly their own position as well) at a 
deeper level than they do before participating in the 
deliberative process. Such an in-depth understanding 
of each other’s reasons is provided by the structure of 
deliberation, whereas that is not the case for the structure 
of bargaining or negotiation processes.
Quite to the contrary, negotiation and bargaining 
structurally support the ideal of ‘winning’ rather than 
the ideal of reaching mutual understanding. The ideal 
of winning that characterizes negotiation processes 
also involves the use of deception, lies and threats. In a 
survey article on negotiation, Leigh Thompson, Juinwen 
Wang and Brian Gunia point out that ‘[g]iven the 
mixed-motive nature of negotiation, it is tempting for 
negotiators to use deception to maximize their personal 
gain’ (Thompson, Wang & Gunia, 2010: 501).12 Similarly, 
Van Parijs characterizes bargaining as a process ‘whereby 
each party uses threats and bluff in order to extract as 
many concessions from the other as it can get away with’ 
(Van Parijs, 2012: 472).
To be sure, negotiation can also be viewed in a more 
positive light. A good example of a more benevolent 
perspective on negotiation is what David Luban calls 
the ‘PPP Paradigm’.13 According to the PPP Paradigm, 
‘negotiation is appeal to standards rather than 
psychological manipulation, it seeks joint rather than 
individual gains, and the opposite party is treated as a 
collaborator rather than an adversary’ (Luban, 1985: 399). 
Similarly, May points out that negotiation typically 
involves both adversarial and cooperative aspects 
(May, 2018). But even if negotiation is not only adversarial, 
but also collaborative in the sense that it appeals to 
standards and that it seeks joint gains, the point remains 
that negotiation is structurally inapt to enable the kind 
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of in-depth understanding that is required for achieving 
a fair compromise. As Gutmann and Thompson formulate 
this contrast between deliberation and bargaining: ‘When 
citizens bargain and negotiate, they may learn how better 
to get what they want. But when they deliberate, they can 
expand their knowledge’ (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004: 
12). More specifically, negotiation only provides for what 
I call ‘first-level understanding’ but not for ‘second-level 
understanding’. In a nutshell, first-level understanding 
pertains to understanding that someone holds a particular 
position, while second-level understanding pertains to 
understanding why someone holds a particular position. 
In what follows, I illustrate the difference between first- 
and second-level understanding with reference to an 
example of a disagreement on abortion (an example to 
which I will refer throughout this section).
Let us assume that a person, Ann, believes that abortion 
is morally right (R) and should therefore be legal (L), 
whereas another person, Bert, believes that abortion 
is morally wrong (W) and should therefore not be legal 
(NL). Ann and Bert therefore disagree on (R) vs. (W) and 
correspondingly on (L) vs. (NL). Let us further assume 
that Ann and Bert are unable to find a consensus on 
their disagreement and therefore aim to find a fair 
compromise.14 Ann and Bert, as citizens who engage in a 
public agreement-seeking process, now have two options. 
They can try to find a fair compromise by negotiation or 
by deliberation.
If they negotiate, they can achieve first-level 
understanding. At this level of understanding, Bert 
understands that Ann wants (L) (and Ann understands that 
B wants (NL)).15 First-level understanding is thus a minimal 
form of understanding, which is however sufficient for the 
purpose of negotiation because it enables the participants 
to comply with the structural requirements of negotiation. 
That is, first-level understanding enables Ann and Bert to 
each propose offers and counteroffers of what they are 
willing to concede.
The question is whether such a negotiation process 
can lead to a fair outcome in the sense that Ann and 
Bert’s concessions are proportional to their stakes 
in this disagreement. This, I claim, is highly unlikely, 
because negotiation processes do not provide for 
second-level understanding, which, as I will show, is 
necessary for evaluating stakes in the first place. Instead, 
in a negotiation process, Ann and Bert make offers and 
counteroffers that are independent of the reasons that the 
other party has for holding their respective position. If 
Ann and Bert negotiate, their interaction is characterized 
by a willingness to mislead and deceive rather than 
to understand each other. In contrast to first-level 
understanding, second-level understanding means that 
Bert understands the reasons why Ann wants (L). That is 
to say, Bert understands that Ann wants (L) because she 
believes (R) and he also understands why Ann believes (R). 
It might, for example, turn out that Ann is a feminist who 
considers abortion to be right primarily from a feminist 
perspective – as a feminist, Ann believes that no one 
should have a say in what happens to a woman’s body but 
the woman herself.
To gain this second-level understanding of Ann’s 
reasons, Bert needs to be structurally required to listen to 
Ann, while Ann needs to be structurally enabled to explain 
her reasons (e.g. by attributing specific time slots for 
reason exchanges of this kind). And it is deliberation, not 
negotiation, that can enable the parties to a disagreement 
to exchange their reasons in this way and thus to develop 
a second-level understanding of the other person’s view.
This is significant because second-level understanding 
is necessary for evaluating stakes and thus, ultimately, 
for achieving a fair compromise. The reason why this is 
so will become clear in the subsequent argument. But in 
a nutshell, the idea is that second-level understanding is 
a necessary precondition for a meaningful evaluation of 
stakes because it is the reasons that each party has for 
holding their position that determines what is at stake 
for them. And evaluating mutual stakes is, in turn, the 
precondition for determining fair concessions because a 
fair compromise requires that each party’s concessions 
are proportional to the stakes that each party has in a 
disagreement.
In sum, the second-level understanding that is the 
foundation for achieving a fair compromise can only 
be achieved through deliberation, but not through 
negotiation. This puts the deliberative process in a unique 
position to enable a fair compromise, while negotiation 
structurally fails in this regard.
Evaluating stakes
Second-level understanding, through deliberation, is the 
first of three stages towards achieving a fair compromise. 
As indicated above, second-level understanding is the 
precondition for evaluating what is at stake for each 
party. This is so because what is at stake for each party 
is determined by each party’s deeper reasons for holding 
their respective views.
To continue with the above example, we have 
established that Ann supports (L) for feminist reasons. 
Indeed, let us assume that Ann has been identifying with 
the feminist movement for several years and that she has 
invested a significant amount of her time in advancing 
the cause. Feminism has therefore become an important 
part of Ann’s identity. Thus, given that the disagreement 
on abortion directly pertains to feminist values, Ann can 
be said to have high stakes involved in this disagreement.
As for Bert, let us assume that Bert is currently enjoying 
the relaxed days of retirement and he realizes that he 
finally has enough time to engage with topics of political 
interest. Even though Bert has never given much thought 
to the topic of abortion, when he comes across the 
argument that abortion is murder, this image immediately 
sticks with him and he finds himself appalled by the idea 
of abortion. Bert therefore wants (NL).
Now let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that 
in this case of disagreement between Ann and Bert, the 
stakes are much higher for Ann than they are for Bert.16 
In this scenario, a fair compromise requires that Bert 
recognizes that Ann has higher stakes involved in the 
disagreement than he does. But, or so I propose, if Ann 
and Bert negotiate, it is highly unlikely that Bert can 
Spang: Why a Fair Compromise Requires Deliberation 65
adequately assess Ann’s stakes. This is so because, as 
elaborated above, negotiation processes do not intend for 
the participants to evaluate each other’s stakes. By its very 
structure, negotiation has no room for stake evaluation – 
which makes sense. After all, why would I be interested in 
knowing what is at stake for you, if what matters, in the 
end, is that I win against you?
In contrast to negotiation, deliberation allows for an 
evaluation of stakes because it structurally provides for a 
meaningful exchange of arguments. This is necessary not 
merely at the first stage of understanding each other’s 
reasons, but also at the stage of evaluating stakes, for 
three reasons.
First, to evaluate what is at stake for Ann, Bert will need 
to learn more about how the abortion question pertains 
to Ann’s identity as a feminist and perhaps also how 
abortion relates to other values that are important to Ann. 
To broaden his understanding in this way, Bert will need 
to deliberate, not negotiate, with Ann.17
Secondly, the process of evaluating stakes is not only 
deliberative in the sense of clarifying emerging questions, 
but also in the sense of discussing the other’s evaluation of 
one’s own stakes. For example, Bert might initially suggest 
that Ann has only slightly higher stakes, an assessment that 
Ann would disagree with. A deliberative process allows 
Ann to express her disagreement with Bert’s assessment 
and to explain why, in her view, she not only has slightly 
higher, but much higher stakes. This process of explaining 
and justifying one’s views is fundamentally deliberative.
Thirdly, the deliberative process of exchanging and 
justifying reasons might not only enable Bert to evaluate 
what is at stake for Ann, but it might also enable him to 
develop a clearer picture of what is at stake for himself.18 
He might, for example, realize that he has overestimated 
the importance that the issue of abortion plays in his own 
life. Alternatively, deliberating with Ann and learning 
about her feminist perspective, Bert might realize that 
a pro-life view does not fit with other values that he 
endorses, such as the empowerment of women. So, even 
though Bert continues to believe in the foetus’s right to 
life, he might hold that belief less strongly, given that it 
contradicts other values that are important to him.
Determining concessions
Let us assume that Bert and Ann have agreed, through 
deliberation, that Ann has higher stakes in their 
disagreement on abortion than Bert. Let us further 
assume that they have also agreed that Ann has much 
higher stakes involved, not only slightly higher stakes. 
But this is still a vague agreement and it is not at all clear 
how this agreement will translate into fair concessions 
for both. A distinct stage in the process of compromising 
therefore consists in determining fair concessions that are 
proportional to the stakes that are involved for each party. 
Importantly, the process of determining fair concessions 
also needs to be deliberative, because Ann and Bert have 
to exchange their reasons why their respective stakes 
should translate into the concessions that they propose.
Let us further assume that Bert agrees to concede to 
Ann’s primary claim that abortion should be legal (L). 
He does so because he acknowledges that Ann has much 
higher stakes in the disagreement on abortion than 
he does.19 Despite Bert’s acknowledgement that Ann’s 
stakes are much higher than his own, this is still a major 
concession on Bert’s part – after all, he continues to 
believe in the foetus’s right to life. Bert might therefore 
argue that since he concedes to Ann’s primary claim (L), 
Ann should concede more in terms of her minor claims, 
such as, for example, the specific conditions under which 
abortion should be legal. Bert might propose, for example, 
that abortion should not be legal after the first trimester, 
or that there should be a certain amount of mandatory 
consulting sessions, etc. – all of which, let us assume, Ann 
opposes.
Ann, on her part, believes that because she has much 
higher stakes in the issue than Bert, her view on the 
conditions for abortion should also have more weight than 
Bert’s. In this hypothetical scenario, the need for further 
deliberation arises, because it needs to be clarified whether 
Ann’s claims regarding the specifics of abortion regulation 
should indeed also weigh more heavily than Bert’s claims 
in this regard. After all, even though both have agreed 
that Ann has much higher stakes in the disagreement 
than Bert, both have also agreed that Bert has at least 
some stakes involved that need to be accommodated if 
the compromise is to be fair. Determining fair concessions 
therefore continues to be a deliberative process.
The question then is: Can negotiation structurally 
enable the determination of fair concessions? The answer, 
I submit, is once again ‘no’. First of all, it seems rather 
unlikely, psychologically speaking, that Ann and Bert 
would even want to negotiate at this stage. That is, after 
having achieved the mutual agreement that Ann has much 
higher stakes involved in their disagreement, it seems very 
unlikely that Bert would suddenly switch into ‘winning 
mode’ and try to get away with as few concessions as he 
can. But, for the sake of argument, let us assume that at 
the stage of determining mutual concessions, Ann and 
Bert indeed start negotiating, with the goal of enforcing 
their claims as best as they can, regardless of fairness 
concerns.
That is, Bert will negotiate for (NL) and Ann will 
negotiate for (L). This not only means that the preceding 
deliberative process becomes meaningless (since, as I have 
argued, second-level understanding and stake evaluation 
do not play a role in negotiation processes); but it also 
means that the outcome of Ann and Bert’s negotiation will 
reflect factors that are independent of fairness concerns, 
especially factors that are related to power.
A primary source of power in negotiations that is widely 
recognized is BATNA, i.e. a negotiator’s ‘best alternative 
to a negotiated agreement’ (Thompson, Wang & Gunia, 
2010: 494). Research has shown that negotiators with 
attractive alternatives are significantly more assertive in 
negotiations than negotiators with less attractive BATNA. 
The influence of power on negotiation outcomes is 
particularly detrimental for the purpose of achieving a fair 
compromise (in the sense discussed in this paper), because 
a fair compromise requires a distribution of concessions 
according to stakes, not according to power.
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Indeed, the fact that negotiation outcomes tend to 
be influenced by BATNA-based power differences puts 
negotiation in an inverse relation to fairness, because 
negotiators with attractive BATNA have, by definition, also 
less at stake in a disagreement. Put differently, if you have 
attractive alternative options to a specific agreement, you 
do not have high stakes involved, because high stakes imply 
that you rely on that agreement to work. The influence of 
BATNA-based power differences on negotiation outcomes 
therefore means that precisely those negotiators with the 
lowest stakes will have the most weight in determining 
the outcome, which is diametrically opposed to what 
is required for a fair compromise – namely that those 
with the lowest stakes should have the least weight in 
determining the outcome.
Gender has been found to be another crucial factor 
in determining power differences in negotiation, with a 
negative effect for female negotiators. Female negotiators 
are at a disadvantage especially if gender stereotypes 
operate at an implicit level. As Thompson, Wang and 
Gunia state in this context, ‘[g]ender salience might thus 
operate like a low-power state, preventing women from 
acting assertively. In [a] study, women did, in fact, get worse 
outcomes than did men in mixed-gender negotiations, 
when an implicit gender stereotype was subtly activated’ 
(Thompson, Wang & Gunia, 2010: 496).20 In addition to 
BATNA- and gender-based power inequalities, we can 
easily think of other fairness-averse factors or skills that 
can determine negotiation outcomes, such as rhetorical 
skills, experience in negotiating or the ability to keep 
one’s nerve in stressful situations.
Therefore, unlike deliberation, negotiation processes 
advantage whoever has more power in terms of BATNA or 
gender, or whoever has more of the skills that make you 
a successful negotiator generally speaking. To be sure, by 
chance, negotiation might result in a fair outcome – but 
do we want to rely on chance when our moral values are 
at stake?21
Possibilities of failure
Finding a fair compromise on issues of moral or political 
disagreement is a delicate process, even more so since 
each stage of the process is vulnerable to failure. At the 
first stage, the participants can fail to adequately convey 
their reasons to each other – mutual understanding 
might simply not emerge. If that is so, finding a fair 
compromise is doomed to failure because the following 
two stages require the first stage of mutual understanding 
to be successful. But even if mutual understanding is 
successfully established, compromise can still fail at the 
next stage, in that the participants might not be able 
to agree who has higher stakes involved. They might 
understand each other’s reasons, but they disagree on 
what these reasons mean in terms of what is at stake for 
each other. Failure at the second stage would, again, ruin 
the chances of achieving a fair compromise, because the 
next stage of determining fair concessions requires an 
agreement on stakes. And even if the first two stages are 
successful, achieving a fair compromise can still fail at the 
third stage, because the disagreeing parties might have 
incompatible views on how their respective stakes should 
translate into concessions.
In this sense, deliberation is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for achieving a fair compromise. 
Much depends on contextual circumstances, such as 
the participants’ mindsets, including their willingness 
to understand each other and to find a fair agreement. 
But, and this is the crucial claim of this paper, without 
deliberation, finding a fair compromise is doomed to 
failure, because only deliberation provides the structure 
that enables the participants to (at least potentially) 
understand each other’s reasons, evaluate each other’s 
stakes and determine concessions that are proportional to 
the stakes involved.
IV. How Important is it that a Compromise is 
Fair?
Given the multiple possibilities of failing to achieve a fair 
compromise, the question arises: How important is it that 
a compromise is fair? If the participants to a process of 
compromising fail at any of the three stages, what is to 
be done? After all, a compromise, even though in that 
situation an unfair one, is still on the table. For example, 
in case the parties to a disagreement fail to agree on a fair 
compromise deliberatively, they might alternatively start to 
bargain or they might simply decide to split the difference. 
However, as I have argued in this paper, neither option 
is likely to result in a fair outcome. The question then is: 
Should the disagreeing parties still compromise, even if 
the outcome is not fair? Put differently, how important is 
it that a compromise is fair? While a satisfactory answer 
to this question is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
worthwhile to outline a few thoughts on this matter.
To start with, in some cases of disagreement, fairness 
might not be the most important aspect of achieving 
a compromise. Whether and to what degree fairness 
matters depends to a significant extent on the context of 
a disagreement. For example, if a buyer and a seller on 
a farmers’ market disagree on the price of a pound of 
apples, a fair outcome of their negotiation, even though 
desirable, is likely not of paramount importance.22 Indeed, 
it seems somewhat inadequate that fairness should be a 
major concern for both parties, given that they would have 
to engage in a deliberative process, aiming at second-level 
understanding of each party’s reasons of why a pound of 
apples should cost a little more or less, and, based on that 
second-level understanding, they would have to evaluate 
what is at stake for each other etc. – which seems excessive 
for the purpose of finding a compromise on the price of a 
pound of apples.
But I submit that fairness should be of paramount 
importance for compromises that affect socio-
political cooperation, such as compromises on moral 
disagreements that occur in civil society or between 
legislators.23 For one thing, a fair compromise in these 
situations can be a manifestation of mutual respect, 
which makes (fair) compromise an indispensable feature 
of democracy (Bellamy, 2012; Weinstock, 2013). And for 
another thing, compromises at the socio-political level 
are often a means to avoid undesirable consequences, 
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such as social strife or stagnation in passing legislation. 
In both cases, the affected parties will want to make sure 
that the compromise lasts. This, in turn, is much more 
likely if both sides consider their compromise to be fair, 
whereas an unfair compromise is not likely to be stable 
over time.
Indeed, seen from a long-term perspective, an unfair 
compromise can be worse than no compromise at all, 
in case the parties to that compromise become aware of 
the unfairness of their agreement after the compromise 
has been made. In that case, the feeling of deception 
can exacerbate the initial conflict – for example, if the 
deceived party feels justified in their initial judgement 
that the other party is morally unreliable. The other party 
is then likely considered to be unreliable not merely 
with regard to their judgement, but also as a matter of 
character. The negative personal perception that is in this 
case added to the initial disagreement will likely make it 
harder to resolve related disagreements in the future.24 
In conclusion, then, we might say that if a compromise is 
desired in terms of socio-political cooperation or stability, 
a fair compromise should be the goal. And, as I have 
argued in this paper, to achieve a fair compromise, we 
need to deliberate rather than negotiate.
Notes
 1 The term ‘compromise’ can be understood to designate 
both a process and an outcome. In this regard, Daniel 
Weinstock distinguishes between ‘compromise’, 
which refers to compromise as a process, and ‘a 
compromise’, which designates compromise as an 
outcome (Weinstock, 2013: 554–555). Furthermore, 
Chiara Lepora introduces a third possible meaning of 
compromise – in addition to compromise understood 
as ‘the act of agreeing’ and ‘the content of the 
agreement’, Lepora points out that compromise can 
also designate ‘the actions pursuant to the agreement’ 
(Lepora, 2012: 1). For the sake of conceptual clarity, I use 
the term ‘compromising’ to designate the agreement-
seeking process and I use the term ‘compromise’ or ‘a 
compromise’ to designate the outcome of that process.
 2 See Mansbridge et al., 2010.
 3 The ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ refers to the idea 
that modern democratic societies are inherently 
characterized by a variety of religious, philosophical 
and moral doctrines that can be equally reasonable 
and yet irreconcilable (Rawls, 2001).
 4 For more detailed discussions of the reasons for 
including compromise in deliberative democracy, 
see Bellamy, 1999, chapters 4 and 5; Bellamy 2012; 
Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, chapter 1; Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2012, chapter 1; Mansbridge et al., 2010; 
Warren & Mansbridge, 2016; Weinstock, 2006.
 5 Both terms, negotiation and bargaining, are used 
synonymously in this paper.
 6 Similarly, May points out that ‘moral correction involves 
the recognition that one’s earlier commitments 
were mistaken. But if the agent comes to accept an 
alternative as a moral compromise, she still views her 
initial position as morally superior’ (May, 2005: 318).
 7 Brighouse and Fleurbaey also propose two other 
justifications for the proportionality principle. They 
argue that the proportionality principle increases 
individual autonomy and that it leads to the best 
social outcomes from a consequentialist perspective 
(see Brighouse & Fleurbaey, 2010: 142). Here, I focus 
on their argument from respect.
 8 Note that I merely claim that deliberation is necessary, 
not that it is sufficient for achieving a fair compromise. 
There are other factors, such as the mindsets of 
the persons involved, that can still prevent a fair 
compromise, even though the required deliberative 
structures are in place.
 9 The word ‘structure’ refers here to the way in which 
an agreement-seeking process is set up in terms of 
how the participants are supposed to interact with 
each other. It is, therefore, the procedural structure 
of an agreement-seeking process that enables or 
inhibits the participants to interact in a certain way. 
The structure of deliberation, for example, provides for 
a mutual exchange of reasons while the structure of 
negotiation provides for a mutual exchange of offers 
and counteroffers.
 10 For the opposite claim that compromising and 
deliberating are analytically distinct activities, see 
Jones & O’Flynn, 2016. The authors argue that 
deliberation can ‘facilitate’ a fair compromise in the 
sense that compromising can set in after deliberation, 
while deliberation is ‘not part of the process of making 
a compromise’ (Jones & O’Flynn, 2016: 17).
 11 Note that I use the term ‘compromising’ or ‘process 
of compromising’ as an umbrella term for the activity 
that spans all three stages. 
 12 The phrase ‘mixed-motive nature of negotiation’ refers 
to the idea that the participants to a negotiation 
process are usually characterized by two conflicting 
motives, cooperation and competition. See Thompson, 
Wang & Gunia, 2010: 499.
 13 ‘PPP’ is short for Positive-sum games, Pareto-optimality 
and Principled bargaining. See Luban, 1985: 399.
 14 Ideally, if a fair compromise is agreed upon by citizens 
in a public setting, their compromise will affect 
macropolitics, e.g. by influencing political agenda 
setting or even legislation. An increasingly discussed 
venue for deliberative processes with macropolitical 
‘uptake’ is called minipublics. Minipublics can have 
macropolitical uptake in different ways, even though 
macropolitical influence is not guaranteed (see Goodin 
& Dryzek, 2006).
 15 For the sake of space, in the following I only refer to 
the case of Bert understanding Ann, but my argument 
applies in the same way to Ann understanding Bert.
 16 I should emphasize that the disagreement between 
Ann and Bert is meant to be purely hypothetical. For 
the purpose of my argument, it does not actually 
matter whether Ann’s stakes are indeed higher 
than Bert’s. The purpose here is only to show that 
deliberation is necessary for evaluating mutual stakes; 
the purpose is not to develop an actual assessment of 
the stakes that can be involved in a disagreement on 
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abortion. This means that ‘real-life Ann and Bert’ could 
well agree on an evaluation of stakes that is contrary 
to the one that I propose in this paper. Whatever 
the outcome of deliberation on abortion can be, the 
crucial point is that deliberation, not negotiation, is 
needed for evaluating stakes. 
 17 It is worth pointing out that even though Bert will 
have to engage deliberatively with Ann in order to 
evaluate what is at stake for her, a large proportion 
of the evaluative process occurs in Bert’s own head. 
This does not make the process of evaluating stakes 
any less deliberative. Indeed, as Robert Goodin argues, 
interpersonal deliberation has an indispensable 
internal dimension. Goodin points out that ‘it remains 
significant how very much of the work of deliberation, 
even in external-collective settings, must inevitably be 
done within each individual’s head’ (Goodin, 2000: 
81). For an in-depth discussion of the intrapersonal 
aspect of compromising specifically, see Lepora, 2012.
 18 Similarly, Weinstock points out that ‘deliberation 
geared toward compromise engages participants 
in a process through which they gain greater self-
clarity as to their own conceptions of the good’ 
(Weinstock, 2017: 651).
 19 To emphasize this again, the point here is not to argue 
that Bert should (or would) necessarily react to Ann’s 
arguments in this way. Rather, the point here is to show 
that deliberation is necessary for enabling Bert to react 
to Ann’s arguments in a meaningful way, i.e. in a way 
that is based on second-level understanding. Whether 
the deliberative structures in place will actually lead 
Ann and Bert to deliberate in this way depends on 
other factors as well. Indeed, as I elaborate in the next 
section, in some situations of disagreement, it might 
well be possible that ‘real-life Bert and Ann’ are not 
able to agree on a fair compromise at all.
 20 The authors suggest that gender-based power 
inequality can be reduced by explicitly counteracting 
gender stereotypes, in the sense of saying: ‘Well, 
unassertive behavior and accommodation may be 
the cultural stereotype of women, but it is surely 
not me!’ (Thompson, Wang & Gunia, 2010: 496). 
However, it seems to me that this strategy of explicitly 
counteracting gender stereotypes cannot reliably 
avoid the problem of gender-based power inequality in 
negotiations, because female negotiators actually have 
to explicitly activate and oppose gender stereotypes, 
which is certainly not something all women can do or 
want to do. 
 21 In this context, Jones and O’Flynn (2013) describe 
the example of two parties with equal bargaining 
strength that – due to their equality in bargaining 
strength – agree on a compromise that consists in 
equal concessions. If splitting the difference equally is 
actually what a fair outcome consists in, these parties 
have indeed arrived at a fair compromise; but they did 
so, and this is the crucial point, without having aimed 
at a fair outcome. The fairness of a compromise that is 
based on bargaining or negotiation is therefore only a 
matter of chance (see Jones & O’Flynn, 2013: 121).
 22 In those cases where fairness is not of importance, 
negotiation is an appropriate way to find a compromise. 
As I have emphasized previously, negotiation is only 
inappropriate if we aim for a fair compromise.
 23 For the opposite claim that fair compromises are 
never a moral desideratum (and that we sometimes 
even have the moral obligation to seek an unfair 
compromise), see Wendt, 2018.
 24 See Kennedy and Pronin (2008) for the argument that 
the perception of one’s opponent as biased is a crucial 
reason why disagreements escalate into full blown 
conflicts rather than be resolved.
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